

## Global Patterns of Decolonization, 1500-1987

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This paper examines global patterns in the breakdown of Western overseas empires between 1500 and 1987. It counterposes the implications of world-economy, Marxist, and institutional arguments for the timing of decolonization. Nonparametric analyses indicate great variation in the rate of decolonization over historical time, and virtually no variation over dependency age. This suggests that the processes producing decolonization are primarily external rather than internal to the dependency. The presence of a hegemonic power, the rise of an anticolonial political discourse, and diffusion processes within and across empires help to explain shifts in the rate of decolonization over historical time.

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One of the fundamental regularities of the Western state system seems to be the transition from colonial dependency to sovereignty. Beginning with Britain's continental colonies in 1783 and ending with the Caribbean islands of Saint Kitts and Nevis in 1983, 165 colonial dependencies have become new independent states or have been fully incorporated into existing sovereign states. As a central feature of the expansion of the Western state system, decolonization finds a parallel only in the process of imperial conquest and colonization. It is far more central than the recognition of non-Western states as sovereign members of the Western "family of nations," which occurs only a handful of times.

This paper seeks some insight into the conditions facilitating decolonization through an analysis of when decolonization occurs. Three broad perspectives on international relations are counterposed as explanations of the rate of decolonization. The first is a world-economy perspective focusing on global cycles in hegemony and economic growth. The second is a Marxist analysis interpreting political change in the light of social structural change in the dependency. The third is an institutional account emphasizing the cognitive dimensions of politics and the impact of dominant models of political organization.

In prior work (Strang, 1990), the author has examined these arguments in event history analyses of decolonization between 1870 and 1987. The relatively short time frame of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries permits a rather detailed analysis, where theoretical arguments can be represented by variables at three levels of measurement: the dependency, the empire, and the world system. Results point to the joint action of several processes of theoretical interest. Perhaps most strikingly,

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decolonization seems affected by a combination of political opportunities provided by American hegemony, the global movement towards political models grounded in popular sovereignty, and the impact of prior decolonization.

Even after a variety of dependency and imperial characteristics are taken into account, there is substantial "system level" variation in the rate of decolonization over the twentieth century. It is difficult to unpack this variation, since the hypothesized causal factors (global economic cycles, hegemony, the legitimacy of colonialism) change slowly over time and are highly correlated. In addition, it is difficult to gauge how general the causal factors involved in twentieth-century decolonization are. For example, is it hegemony per se, or specifically American hegemony, that accelerates decolonization?

This paper seeks to address these issues by examining the relationship between systemic conditions and decolonization over a considerably longer period, 1500 to 1987. This enlarged temporal framework permits more powerful tests of the impact of slowly changing global economic and political conditions. This power comes at a price, however; data limitations make it difficult to examine or control for the effects of dependency or metropolitan characteristics over five hundred years. The low frequency dynamics of decolonization investigated here should thus be seen as complementary to, and as providing a context for, analysis of the local conditions facilitating decolonization.

## Theoretical Perspectives

### *World-Economy Arguments*

Students of the world economy are nearly alone in having produced quantitative analyses of global patterns in Western imperialism. Bergesen and Schoenberg (1980), McGowan (1985) and Boswell (1989) connect levels of imperial activity over time to systemic processes of power concentration and economic growth. While their attention focuses on the total amount of imperial activity, their arguments also apply to the process of decolonization per se.

A first concern is with the distribution of power among core states. World-economy theorists focus on the contrast between a hegemonic distribution of power, where a single state is predominant, and a multicentric distribution, where no such state exists. Economic power is emphasized; for example, Wallerstein (1983) defines hegemony in terms of simultaneous pre-eminence in production, commerce, and finance.

Multicentric distributions are argued to lead to strong political controls over peripheral areas, while hegemony loosens these controls. Chase-Dunn and Rubinson (1979:464) argue that "A more equal distribution of competitive advantage in the core leads to greater competition among core states and a more formal and monopolistic structure of control between core states and peripheral areas." Realist students of international political economy make a parallel argument about the action of the hegemonic state. Krasner (1976) suggests that a hegemon has both the incentive and the capability to construct an open trading regime, while relative parity among states leads to a fragmented international trade regime (also see Kindleberger, 1973; Lake, 1984).

A second line of argument concerns the rate of global economic growth. Periods of global economic stagnation are thought to lead to the construction and maintenance of formal dependencies, while periods of economic expansion produce looser ties to peripheral areas. Again, the argument stresses competition within the core. A falling rate of profit leads core states to tighten their control of the periphery, while periods marked by opportunities for internal investment make controls less necessary (Chase-Dunn and Rubinson, 1979).

The loosening of political controls over peripheral areas should affect different forms of decolonization in different ways. On the one hand, hegemony and economic expansion should accelerate decolonization through national independence or unification with another peripheral state. On the other, hegemony and economic expansion should slow decolonization in the sense of full incorporation into the metropolis (or any other core state). Incorporation may be expected to tighten political, social, and economic linkages between the overseas territory and the metropolis.

To formulate expected patterns of decolonization, it is necessary to specify how these conditioning factors vary over time. World-economy theorists argue that both hegemony and economic growth follow cyclic rhythms. This is characteristic of the world-economy perspective; less than a page in the programmatic paper "Cyclical Rhythms and Secular Trends of the Capitalist World-Economy" (Working Group, 1979) is devoted to secular trends.

Cycles of hegemony are argued to result from the internal dynamics of a capitalist world economy. Uneven development, pressures for innovation, and the state's interference lead to the concentration of capital. But dominant economies tend to decline relative to competitors, due to the diffusion of technological advances and the overhead costs of maintaining systemic stability (Chase-Dunn and Rubinson, 1979:464). These arguments are bolstered by work on military hegemony, which emphasizes cycles grounded in the trap of territorial commitments (Thompson and Zuk, 1986) and the costs of attaining global supremacy (Rasler and Thompson, 1983).

The world-economy literature identifies global economic cycles with Kondratieff waves. Kondratieff waves are hypothesized cycles in prices and production of about fifty years in duration, argued to result from factors as diverse as capital investment, technological breakthroughs, and capitalist crises. Goldstein (1985, 1988) reviews this literature and provides some systematic evidence for global cycles in prices since the sixteenth century.

World-economy arguments thus suggest that decolonization should be synchronized to cycles in hegemony and global economic expansion. Decolonization via independence should be more rapid in periods when a hegemonic power is present, and during economic booms in the world economy. Decolonization via incorporation should show the reverse pattern.<sup>1</sup>

#### *Marxist Arguments*

While world-economy arguments focus on the interaction of economic processes and political action at the level of the system as a whole, classical Marxist arguments focus on the structural transformation of peripheral economies.<sup>2</sup> Political controls are seen as essential to primitive accumulation occurring in precapitalist economies or at the fringes of capitalized economies. But over time, capitalist arrangements supplant primitive accumulation based on simple coercion. Subsistence economies are monetized and drawn into world markets, peasants are driven into the city, and national and comprador bourgeois emerge.

It is at the shift from primitive accumulation to incorporation into the world economy that decolonization should occur. Marxists have classically looked to urban workers and the bourgeoisie as national revolutionaries (Wallerstein, 1976). And

<sup>1</sup> As a reviewer for this paper pointed out, however, a world-economy theorist cannot predict whether decolonization itself should appear cyclic without examining how hegemonic cycles and Kondratieff waves overlap.

<sup>2</sup> It may seem strange to counterpose world-economy and Marxist arguments, since the world-economy perspective is underpinned by a variant of classical Marxism (Szymanski, 1981). But for the case of decolonization, world-economy theorists have attended to competition within the core rather than transformation of productive relations in the periphery. It thus seems important to keep the two arguments conceptually distinct.

from the point of view of external capital, there is little need of overt political linkages to the larger world system once strong economic linkages are in place (Bergesen and Schoenberg, 1980). At this stage the overhead costs of formal political controls outweigh their remaining advantages.

The general prediction, then, is that decolonization should increase over time, since it is exposure to Western capitalist structures that transforms peripheral societies. Two measures of time appear relevant. By one line of theory, the level of development of Western capitalist structures determines the speed of peripheral transformation (Szymanski, 1981). This implies that the rate of decolonization should increase with historical time.

Mainstream Marxist accounts also maintain that imperialism accelerates the economic transformation of non-Western societies. In contrast to the world-economy perspective, the drive to exploit colonial markets is argued to lead to the export of capital from the imperial center to the periphery (Marx, 1853; Lenin, 1917). This implies that dependency age (the length of time since colonization) should be positively related to the chances of decolonization. Since this process of internal transformation is complementary to one of external development, a Marxist perspective suggests that the rate of decolonization should increase with both historical time and dependency age.

#### *Institutional Arguments*

Institutional arguments form an increasingly important addition to modes of political analysis (Ashley, 1984; March and Olsen, 1984; Krasner, 1988). They have entered international relations through the regime literature's stress on the collective understandings and procedures that organize state interaction (Krasner, 1983; Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986). A related set of arguments, also resting on the notion of a state society (Bull, 1977) or world polity (Meyer, 1980), emphasize the meaning and legitimacy of political structures. An institutional account suggests that behavior is constrained and guided by models of possible and appropriate action (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).<sup>3</sup>

One argument flowing from this premise is that decolonization involves the transmission of the nation-state model from Western powers to their dependencies. Elite and mass education in the periphery provide channels for the export of Western notions of popular sovereignty and a broadly incorporative state. While Marxists point to the rise of the bourgeoisie and wage labor, an institutional account might point to the rise of Western educated elites, teachers, and civil servants.

A second argument considers decolonization as a diffusion process, where prior decolonization increases the rate of future decolonization. Even the first instance of decolonization, the (North) American Revolution, seemed to generate imitation in Haiti and Hispanic America. In the twentieth century, the independence of India is often seen as a crucial turning point, while Ghana's independence served as a catalyst for national liberation movements all over Africa. And once decolonization was in full swing in the 1960s, perceptions of possible change blossomed into the conviction that decolonization was inevitable. This conviction appears to have had an especially strong impact on the emergence of microstates in the 1970s, which a decade before were thought incapable of self-rule.

Both of these arguments, institutional in their emphasis on external political models, suggest that rates of decolonization should increase over historical time. Liberal, corporatist, and state socialist variants of expanded popular sovereignty became

<sup>3</sup> Elsewhere (Strang, 1990) I have referred to institutional arguments in the international context as forming a "world polity" perspective.

dominant models of political organization during the twentieth century (though their promise of high levels of participation and enhanced citizenship rights was not necessarily realized in practice). By the 1960s the world community had come to espouse rapid decolonization, grounding this stance in notions of popular sovereignty and individual rights.

Diffusion arguments are also closely linked to historical time. It is "external," global time that marks the effects of prior decolonization. And formal models of diffusion, which generate S-shaped aggregate rates of decolonization, imply instantaneous transition rates that rise monotonically with time (Strang, 1991). Internal measures of time (i.e., measures of time specific to the individual rather than the environment) have no postulated relation to diffusion effects.

### The "Life Histories" of Dependencies

An examination of temporal patterns in decolonization requires knowledge of the founding and dissolution dates of colonial dependencies. This section discusses the criteria defining movement into and out of dependent status, some of the issues involved, and the data set constructed on the basis of these definitions.

The dependencies of Western states were created in two ways. In many cases, European states regarded non-European lands as unoccupied or unclaimed by a legitimate ruler. Western states therefore created many dependencies without reference to existing polities, organizing a colonial government directly or chartering private individuals or corporations to do so. I treat the formation of an administrative structure as the criterion for the creation of a dependency; a mere claim to territory is not sufficient.

The second main route to imperial expansion was through conquest of or treaty-making with a non-Western polity. Either the assignment of a colonial administrator (as above) or the signing of a treaty where a non-European ruler cedes significant aspects of his sovereignty are the definitive acts of political imperialism. These include protectorates, where a ruler retains internal sovereignty while relinquishing external independence. This approach also includes relatively loose forms of political dependency, such as Britain's "protected states" and U.S. control of the public finance of Haiti and Nicaragua in the early twentieth century.

Polities move out of dependent status in a variety of ways, only some of which involve moving into sovereign status. First, dependencies may exit the world of Western political definition when they are abandoned (as Mauritius was in the seventeenth century) or conquered by non-Western forces (as when Oran was seized by the Ottomans in 1708). They may also merge to form a larger polity or separate into component dependencies. In each of these cases, one can utilize the information that the political unit did *not* become sovereign during its career as a dependency.

Dependencies generally become sovereign as new independent states. The general criteria for independence is recognition by the metropolitan power. Britain's continental colonies are coded as sovereign in 1783, at the signing of the Treaty of Paris, and not at the declaration of independence (1776) or the expulsion of British troops (1781). Since the unit of analysis here is the dependency, not the new sovereign state, the decolonization of 13 American colonies counts as 13 events, and the creation of a sovereign India and Pakistan out of British India as a single decolonization event. Where metropolitan recognition and that of the international community as a whole are at variance, the latter is taken as authoritative.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> The independence of Spanish South America is thus coded as 1830, when the U.S., Great Britain, and France had all recognized the sovereignty of the Latin American republics. Spain acceded to Latin American independence in 1836.

A second route to sovereign status is through full incorporation of the dependency into an existing sovereign state. Alaska and Hawaii's acquisition of statehood form instances of this type of decolonization, as does the reorganization of France's *colonies anciens* as overseas departments. In other cases, dependencies are incorporated into states other than their metropolises, as when Portuguese Goa became part of India in 1961. When a metropole's redefinition of a dependency as an integral part of the domestic polity is widely disputed by other states, as was the case for Portuguese colonies after 1951, the dependency is not considered to become sovereign.

Dependencies are thus constructed by the organization of concrete administrative structures or the proclamation of formal treaties, but become sovereign through formal recognition. This change in emphasis mirrors the shift from a position "outside" the Western international system to membership within it. Imperial expansion by Western powers occurred without reference to other states or the international system as a whole—in fact, it was the position of non-European peoples and polities outside the Western "family of nations" that made imperialism legitimate. By contrast, the emergence of a new polity as a sovereign state involves more than *de facto* independence; it implies international acceptance of the polity's right of internal jurisdiction and external freedom of action.

The data set attempts to cover the formal political domination of non-European territories by Western states. It excludes "internal" colonies situated within Europe, such as the regions making up the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and also the dependencies of non-Western states. Temporally, the study begins in 1500 and ends in 1987. This period provides the context of a Western economic and political system that all three theoretical perspectives presuppose (Wallerstein, 1974; Levy, 1983; Ruggie, 1983).<sup>5</sup>

Comprehensive listings of political entities provided by Henige (1970) and Banks (1987) served to establish the founding and decolonization dates of most dependencies. The definition of decolonization was changed to mean sovereign recognition, rather than removal of the colonial governor. This led to new dates of decolonization, particularly in the cases of nineteenth-century independence struggles in the Americas (*de facto* control of territory, metropolitan recognition, and generalized recognition are nearly simultaneous in the twentieth century). It also led to the discovery of decolonization events. For example, France elevated its overseas colonies to full equality with the metropolis in the Constitution of the Year III (1795)—a kind of decolonization included in this data set though unrecorded by Henige. (They were returned to dependent status under Napoleon in 1803, and reenter the data set as dependencies at that time.) Secondary sources were used to code indirectly administered dependencies (for example, British protectorates in the Middle East, Caribbean protectorates of the United States in the early twentieth-century, South Africa's homelands). The appendix lists the dependencies analyzed in this paper.<sup>6</sup>

### Time Dependence in Decolonization

The analysis of temporal patterns begins with a plot of the number of dependencies in existence each year between 1500 and 1987. Attention then turns to a more detailed

<sup>5</sup> Boswell (1989) argues that it is necessary to ignore events occurring in the last thirty years, due to shifts in the colonial "regime." I disagree, and regard massive decolonization after 1960 as something important to be explained. If the discourse surrounding formal dependency shifts in the post-World War II era, I would treat this as a factor in modelling decolonization rather than a rationale for truncating the analysis.

<sup>6</sup> I hasten to add that I do not claim close local knowledge of all colonial arrangements on the scale of this study, and I am sure additional information would improve the quality of the data set. I would be surprised, however, if fuller information altered the results reported here.




FIG. 1. Non-European dependencies, 1500–1987.

examination of movement from dependency to sovereignty. Here, nonparametric event history methods are employed to describe temporal patterns in the instantaneous transition rate of decolonization.

The transition from dependency to sovereignty occurs 165 times between 1500 and 1987. Of these events, 132 produce a new sovereign state, twenty-three involve the full political incorporation of the dependency into the metropolis, and ten involve the incorporation of the dependency into some other sovereign state. These three forms of decolonization are combined in the graphical analysis.

Figure 1 plots the number of dependencies in existence for each year between 1500 and 1987. Altogether, 478 dependencies were in existence during some part of this period. In 1500, nine overseas dependencies of Western states existed, including African enclaves like Tangier and Ifni, the Cape Verde and Canary Islands, and the first American dependency, Santo Domingo (founded in 1496). The number of dependencies rose steadily over the next 150 years, reaching a plateau in the mid-seventeenth century. The count then fluctuated around a level of ninety Western dependencies until the late nineteenth century—during this time, new colonization




FIG. 2. Decolonization by historical time for western dependencies, 1500–1987.

is roughly matched by movement to sovereignty and the mergers of existing dependencies. From 1880 to 1920 a second massive increase in the number of colonies occurred. Numerically, Western colonialism peaked at 154 dependencies in 1921. The number then fell rapidly, passing one hundred in 1961 and fifty in 1978. By 1987, thirty-five non-European dependencies remained.

#### *Movement to Sovereignty: Historical Time*

While Figure 1 gives some sense of the historical timing of decolonization, it combines the results of too many processes (rates of colonial creation, abandonment, and merger, as well as decolonization) to provide a sound basis for description. I make use of event history methodology to focus on the timing of decolonization. Here, the central quantity is the *instantaneous transition rate* (often shortened to rate, and also referred to as the hazard), which is defined as

$$r_{jk}(t) = \lim_{\Delta t \downarrow 0} \frac{Pr_{jk}(t, t + \Delta t)}{\Delta t} \quad (1)$$

where  $Pr(\cdot)$  is the probability of an event between  $t$  and  $t + \Delta t$ . Intuitively, the rate is akin to the ratio of the number of events occurring during an interval of time divided by the number of cases "at risk" of experiencing an event. An excellent methodological introduction is provided by Allison (1984); more technical presentations include Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) and Tuma and Hannan (1984).

Graphical analysis of the relationship between rate of decolonization and time is performed via nonparametric estimates of the integrated hazard (Nelson, 1972; Aalen, 1978). In these plots, the estimated rate of decolonization is given by the *slope* of the curve. This means that a straight line signals the absence of temporal variation in the rate of decolonization; an increasing (decreasing) slope signals that the rate of decolonization is increasing (decreasing) over time.

Figure 2 plots the integrated hazard of decolonization against historical time. Dramatic variation in the slope of the curve indicates four distinct historical eras.



From the beginnings of European colonization in the fifteenth century to the late eighteenth century, the transition rate is virtually zero. No dependencies become sovereign during this period, either as independent states or through integration into an already sovereign state. This is an era when dependencies are creatures of the metropole, as trading enclaves or plantations (Parry, 1963).

The curve rises sharply but briefly from the late eighteenth century to the 1830s. This is the period of American wars of independence, first in the British continental colonies, and then in Brazil, Haiti, and Spanish Central and South America. Though the largest settler colonies won their independence during this period, much territory remained in dependent status: most important, the lucrative plantation economies of the Caribbean, and the domains of the British and Netherlands East India Companies.

The third period is one of resumed stability of dependent relations. The only transition occurring between 1831 and 1923 is the incorporation of the Mosquito Coast into Honduras, which followed its cession by Great Britain in 1860. The nineteenth century is the period of the Pax Britannica and the industrialization of Europe. The last three decades of the nineteenth century saw the rapid expansion of Western empires, most spectacularly in the fevered partition of Africa.

The fourth period begins at the close of World War I and continues until the present. It witnesses a massive wave of decolonization, both more rapid and more extensive than the previous wave of American decolonization. Over the seventy-year period, 130 dependencies between sovereign. The first transitions took place in 1924, when the United States revoked its rights of interference over the Dominican Republic and the USSR fully incorporated the Central Asian states of Khiva and Bukhara, which Imperial Russia had held as protectorates. Seventeen dependencies became sovereign between 1924 and 1945, including Canada, Australia, the Union of South Africa, and several Arab nations.

The rate of decolonization increased rapidly in the post-World War II era. It reached a peak in 1960, when eighteen African dependencies become sovereign states. The rate of decolonization remained high through the 1970s, with twenty-five insular "microstates" becoming sovereign in that decade. Only in the 1980s did the wave of twentieth-century decolonization seem to exhaust itself. Five events occurred between 1980 and 1987: the independence of Brunei, Belize, Saint Kitts, and Antigua and Barbuda, and the incorporation of the Cocos Islands into Australia.

This historical pattern is consistent at a general level with the predictions of all three perspectives. From one point of view, it may be interpreted as evidence for an underlying cyclic process. This is the position taken by Bergesen and Schoenberg (1980), who argue that imperial activity increases during periods of system instability and multicentricity, and decreases during periods of stability and hegemony. They connect the first wave of decolonization to the Pax Britannica, and the second to the Pax Americana. Bergesen and Schoenberg believe a third wave of heightened political controls over the periphery is already underway, due to the decline of American hegemony.

From another point of view, the most remarkable feature of Figure 2 is the massive increase in the rate of decolonization over the last half century.<sup>7</sup> If there are two waves of decolonization, the second is much more complete than the first. Between 1783 and 1833, thirty-four decolonization events took place, reducing the total number of dependencies from ninety-six to seventy-eight. By contrast, the twentieth-century wave of decolonization saw a drop from 153 to thirty-five colonial dependencies, with 130 decolonization events occurring over sixty years. Marxist and institu-

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<sup>7</sup> This is not an artifact of the larger number of colonies at the outset of the twentieth century. The rapid increase in the rate of decolonization indicates more rapid decolonization per existing dependency, not more total decolonization events (a quantity that increases even faster).




FIG. 3. Decolonization by dependency age for western dependencies, 1500–1987.

tional perspectives offer two competing explanations of this secular trend: the intensification of the world capitalist economy and the rise of the nation-state.

#### *Movement to Sovereignty: Dependency Age*

Substantial historical variations in the rate of decolonization do not eliminate the possibility that decolonization also varies with the age of the dependency. In fact, "age dependence" can give rise to apparent dependence on historical time if rates of colonization vary over time (which they do).

To examine the pattern of age dependence, Figure 3 displays the integrated hazard of decolonization versus dependency age. Dependency age is defined here as time since initial colonization, which pinpoints the effects of exposure to Western economic institutions. Dependencies are plotted only for the first two hundred years after colonization. Beyond that time there are so few cases at risk of decolonization that little can be said about patterns of variation.

The slope of the integrated hazard is close to linear in Figure 3, signalling a transition rate that is constant with respect to the age of the dependency. There is thus little indication in these figures of an effect of a structural transformation initiated by colonization. While dependencies may undergo structural transformation, this does not appear to affect the rate of decolonization.<sup>8</sup>

Moderate effects of dependency age might be masked by a large effect of historical time. But parametric models including both age and historical time show that only the latter bears a significant relation to the rate of decolonization. Substantively, external processes of change in the larger world environment appear to dominate internal processes of change within the dependency.

<sup>8</sup> I also explored the possibility that decolonization might vary with time since the present colonial administration was formed, due to a "liability of newness" prior to the development of solid administrative and political controls. The rate of decolonization was invariant with this alternative conceptualization of age as well.

### Models of Decolonization

The previous section revealed suggestions of both cycles and a secular trend in decolonization over historical time. As such, these results do not arbitrate between some of the central predictions of the world-economy, Marxist, and institutional perspectives. Nor do they provide a strong test of the predictions of each theory. For example, decolonization might occur in waves, but these might not be synchronized to the factors identified by world-economy arguments. This section explores parametric models simultaneously examining the impact of specific factors suggested by different theoretical perspectives.

#### *Variables*

Wallerstein's (1983) periodization of hegemony is used to examine world-economy arguments about the distribution of economic power among core states. Wallerstein claims that there have been three periods when a single state is dominant in manufacturing, commerce, and finance: the United Provinces of the Netherlands from 1625 to 1671, Great Britain from 1815 to 1873, and the United States from 1945 to 1967. The variable Economic Hegemony equals one during these periods and zero otherwise.

"Hegemony" is often used in a different sense to refer to a *militarily* dominant power within the world system (Modelski, 1978; Modelski and Thompson, 1988). In the present context, there is considerable overlap between the effects of military and economic dominance; for example, Bergesen and Schoenberg (1980) develop arguments about both in distinguishing periods of stability and instability. To examine these arguments I make use of Modelski and Thompson's (1988) measures of naval capacity, since a navy is necessary for maintaining a military presence in the dependency. Military Hegemony is defined as the proportion of the world's naval capacity possessed by the largest naval power.

Goldstein's (1985, 1988) work on Kondratieff waves is used to explore the effects of global economic cycles. Goldstein develops a periodization of eleven upswings and downswings in the world economy since 1495 from the Kondratieff wave literature (data from the 1985 article are used). The variable Economic Upswing equals one during periods of global expansion and zero during periods of contraction.

Diffusion effects are central to many institutional arguments, suggesting one way that external pressures can act to homogenize action despite local differences (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). They may be measured in an event history context by using the number of prior decolonization events within the population as an explanatory variable. This strategy represents an individual-level analogue to classic epidemic models (Strang, 1991).<sup>9</sup>

However, an institutional understanding of diffusion forms only one possible interpretation of the effect of prior decolonization. One might also stress the way metropolitan resources are stretched by multiple national liberation movements, or the impact of previous decolonization on imperial policy. To distinguish institutional effects from alternative mechanisms, two variables are constructed. The first counts the number of previous decolonization events within the empire, and is susceptible to both institutional and noninstitutional interpretations. The second variable counts only decolonization events outside the empire, and represents the institutional argument in a purer form.

Finally, the institutional perspective points to the importance of global ideologies and political discourse. As noted above, the post-World War II era witnessed a shift

<sup>9</sup> More complex diffusion formulations, such as models permitting "infectiousness" to wear off over time, are only beginning to be developed in the event history context (Strang and Tuma, 1990).

from theories legitimating imperialism as the product of the racial or social superiority of the West to condemnation of imperialism as contrary to basic human rights. (Early twentieth-century doctrines of imperial "trusteeship" may be seen as a halfway house in this shift.) I use the United Nation's Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960) to date the crystallization of anti-imperialism as the dominant position in global political discourse. The variable U.N. Declaration equals one after 1960 and zero before.

#### *Modelling Framework*

The following analyses test parametric models of the rate of decolonization through national independence or incorporation into an existing state other than the former metropolis. Incorporation into the metropolis is excluded, since the theoretical discussion and some descriptive analyses suggest possible differences in the precipitants of the two types of decolonization.<sup>10</sup> Unfortunately, there are too few cases of incorporation, over too long a historical period, to sustain a multivariate analysis focusing solely on this type of event.

The chief goal of these analyses is to simultaneously examine the effects of predictions from the world-economy and institutional perspectives. Since the two forms of hegemony represent different facets of a single argument (and likewise for the institutional variables), they are kept separate in the analyses presented below. Four models are thus reported, each of which examines a different combination of measures from the three theoretical perspectives. This approach permits some insight into the robustness of the predictions made by each perspective.

Analyses control for dependence on historical time to provide a stronger test of the contribution made by the variables described above. Technically, I employ a Gompertz framework,

$$r_{jk}(t) = \exp(X\beta + \gamma t), \quad (2)$$

where the rate is an exponential function of explanatory variables and historical time.<sup>11</sup>

#### *Results*

Table 1 reports the results of models simultaneously examining the impact of global economic expansion, hegemony, and institutional process. The latter two arguments are each measured in two different ways, so models A through D represent the four possible combinations of the two sets of variables.  $\chi^2$  statistics refer to likelihood ratio tests comparing the model to a baseline Gompertz model, which includes only the effect of historical time. Large values imply significant improvement in the fit of the model as a whole, where degrees of freedom equal the difference in the number of parameters in the two models. All models are estimated using RATE (Tuma, 1980).

In both models A and C, Economic Hegemony significantly raises the rate of decolonization. This is in line with Boswell's (1989) analysis of net colonization, and with a variety of arguments within the world-economy perspective. Holding other effects constant, estimated rates of decolonization are about five times larger when

<sup>10</sup> Results are robust with respect to the definition of the events of interest. The omission of incorporation into other states or the addition of incorporation into the metropolis do not produce findings substantially different than those reported below.

<sup>11</sup> Semiparametric techniques for controlling for time dependence, Cox's (1972) partial likelihood method, are inappropriate here since it cannot estimate the effects of system-level variables.

TABLE 1. ML Parameter Estimates for the Transition from Dependency to Sovereign Independence, 1500–1987 (standard errors in parentheses); 142 decolonization events occurred.

<i>Variable</i>	<i>A</i> <i>Estimate</i>	<i>B</i> <i>Estimate</i>	<i>C</i> <i>Estimate</i>	<i>D</i> <i>Estimate</i>
$\beta_0$	-11.61** (0.97)	-10.80** (0.80)	11.09** (0.82)	-10.36** (0.67)
Economic Hegemony	1.64** (0.26)		1.54** (0.26)	
Military Hegemony		0.93* (0.47)		1.02 (0.55)
Economic Upswing	-0.68* (0.27)	0.33 (0.20)	-0.69* (0.26)	0.34 (0.18)
Prior Decolonization				
Within Empire	0.030** (0.004)	0.029** (0.004)	0.012** (0.004)	0.011** (0.004)
Outside Empire	0.014** (0.003)	0.013** (0.003)		
U.N. Declaration			1.63** (0.24)	1.73** (0.24)
Historical Time	0.012** (0.002)	0.010** (0.002)	0.012** (0.002)	0.009** (0.001)
Log Likelihood	-736	-757	-719	-737
Likelihood Ratio $\chi^2$ versus $r(t) = \exp(\beta_0 + \gamma_0 t)$ (d.f.)	164.5** 5	122.3** 5	198.0** 5	162.1** 5

\*\* p &lt; 0.01

\* p &lt; 0.05

a single power is economically dominant in the world system (exponentiating the coefficient gives the multiplier of the estimated rate when the binary variable equals one).

Military Hegemony does not bear as clear a relation to decolonization. It has a barely significant effect in model B, and an insignificant one in model D. This is somewhat surprising, since American military hegemony provides a better explanation of decolonization in the 1970s and 1980s than does its declining economic hegemony. However, institutional variables provide a more consistent account of the rapid rise in decolonization after World War II than either of these factors. And military hegemony provides a weaker match to pre-twentieth century variations in the rate of decolonization than does economic hegemony.<sup>12</sup>

Periods of economic expansion (upswings in Kondratieff waves) are inconsistently related to decolonization across model specifications. They decrease the rate of decolonization when economic hegemony is included in the model, but are positive and insignificant when military hegemony is substituted. Both results run counter to the world-economy argument that colonial powers are less concerned to retain dependencies during periods of economic growth. It may be that more attention should be paid to the motives of actors in the dependency. Global economic expansion may produce additional trade opportunities within the imperial framework, diminishing the appeal of national independence.

<sup>12</sup> Models including both economic and military hegemony found positive and significant effects of the former and insignificant effects of the latter.

The number of prior decolonization events within the empire consistently raises the rate of decolonization. As discussed above, there are a variety of mechanisms by which prior decolonization might influence present action. In some cases, the loss of a key dependency may reduce the value of other dependencies in metropolitan eyes. For example, a number of British colonies were acquired to safeguard the route to India; these suddenly became expendable when India and Pakistan became sovereign states. In other cases, intra-imperial diffusion may result from communication and imitation among dependencies.

Models A and B shows that events outside the empire also increase the rate of decolonization. Since both historical time and events within empires are included in the equation, this effect gives strong evidence for the way decolonization came to be fueled by its own momentum. Prior decolonization, even in geographically and culturally disconnected dependencies, added to global understandings of the legitimacy and inevitability of decolonization. And while its coefficient is about half the size of the coefficient for prior decolonization within the empire, the estimated impact of decolonization outside the empire is generally larger, since about three times as many events occurred outside than inside the average dependency's empire.

This process is captured in a different way through the shift in political discourse, here marked by the United Nation's declaration opposing colonialism. Models C and D indicate that the estimated rate of decolonization is more than five times higher after 1960 than before, holding other effects constant. The two variables are not only historically coincident but substantively bound together, since the United Nations' declaration was based on the votes of former dependencies.

In all four models, the addition of exogenous variables increases the fit of the model as a whole. They also halve the estimated effect of historical time, which equals 0.022 when no covariates are included in the model. Most of this shift is due to the introduction of the institutional variables. This is natural, since these effects are intended to provide a theoretical account for the secular trend in decolonization. Models including only world-economy measures, designed to index cyclic processes, do not help to account for the trend.

These results are quite robust with respect to the starting date of the study. Analyses beginning in 1648 (the Peace of Westphalia, often treated as the beginnings of the modern international system) gave very similar results to those presented above. A second set of exploratory analyses are conditioned on the American Revolution, beginning the analysis in 1783; here, too, results were substantially similar to those reported in Table 3.

Results do vary, however, when recent decolonization is excluded from analysis. In particular, truncation of the analysis prior to 1960 weakens the impact of the institutional variables. Of course, no effect can be estimated for the U.N. Declaration unless the analysis extends beyond 1960. And if the analysis is truncated in 1945, or even 1955, the impact of prior decolonization outside the empire cannot be disentangled from that of historical time.<sup>13</sup> The main evidence for diffusion is the surge in decolonization through the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. This surge is too rapid to be accounted for by historical time, and continues too long to be explained with reference to hegemony. The sensitivity of the institutional variables to the ending point of the study thus does not suggest a lack of generality. Instead, it makes explicit the feature of the historical pattern of decolonization explained by the institutional arguments measured here.

By ascribing a substantial effect to historical time, the models in Table 3 leave much unexplained. What is it about historical time that increases the rate of decolonization,

<sup>13</sup> Diffusion across empires has a strong and significant effect across all definitions of the study period when dependence on historical time is not built into the analysis.

net of measured covariates? As noted above, two plausible factors are structural changes in national economies and the world economy in general, and ideological changes in dominant models of political organization. While this paper is unable to directly test these arguments, analyses of metropolitan- and dependency-level factors in twentieth-century decolonization point to the latter process (Strang, 1990). Decolonization accelerates when the metropolitan state has a broad suffrage regime, and when the dependency has elected self-governing institutions; it is unaffected by the economic development of the dependency (as measured by urbanization and foreign trade per capita).

Overall, these findings support predictions from both the world-economy and institutional perspectives. Economic hegemony helps to explain the cyclic component of decolonization shown in Figure 1. Diffusion across empires and the construction of an anti-imperialist global discourse help to explain the secular trend in decolonization.

Further analysts of decolonization may find it useful to probe the interaction between these two sets of processes. The results presented here suggest that one way to do so is to consider how the impact of hegemony varies over time. In the seventeenth century, Dutch hegemony led not to decolonization but to the reshuffling of colonial possessions among imperial powers. Nineteenth-century British hegemony aided independence movements on one continent, when the British navy stood ready to block the reconquest of Spanish America. And in the twentieth century, American hegemony lent broad ideological support to nationalist movements, accelerating rapid, worldwide decolonization. One can speculate that in each case the rise of a hegemonic state disrupted existing imperial structures, while the extent to which this disruption resulted in decolonization varies with the political models and institutions of the era.

### Conclusions

This article has discussed the broad historical pattern of decolonization in the Western international system. In doing so it has tried to explicitly link these patterns to theoretical understandings of the Western international system. This strategy allows this study to examine the utility of a number of specific arguments within the world-economy, Marxist, and institutional perspectives (while not arbitrating between perspectives as general accounts). It suggests a "big picture" which may inform studies with more depth and less breadth.

The chief findings of the graphical analyses are that the rate of decolonization varies dramatically with historical time and is invariant with respect to dependency age. This is contrary to Marxist notions of socioeconomic transformation induced by closer contact with the West, and more generally at odds with emphases on processes occurring within dependencies. It thus seems crucial to focus on change in the larger world economic and political system. There is some suggestion of cycles in decolonization, but even more of a massive secular trend where rates of decolonization increase over historical time.

In the parametric analysis, world-economy and institutional arguments identify specific conditions promoting decolonization. The presence of an economically dominant state helps to explain part of the cyclic component in decolonization. Institutional processes provide an explanation of the secular trend, particularly its acceleration after 1945. These results suggest a contextual framework on which further research may be able to elaborate. In particular, the study of decolonization should benefit from theoretical and empirical work seeking to combine world-economy and institutional perspectives.

### Appendix. Western colonial dependencies, 1500–1987.

This appendix lists the dependencies analyzed in this paper. It does so in terms of “dependency spells,” defined as the time interval during which the political unit was a colonial dependency of a Western power. Note that the names given in this appendix are those of the dependency, not the polity it becomes after independence. For example, the reference is to Ubangi Shari rather than the Central African Republic. Data sources and coding criteria are described in the text.

If the dependency spell ends in decolonization, the dependency is marked with a single asterisk (\*) when this involves incorporation into the colonial power, and by two asterisks (\*\*) when decolonization involves independence or union with some other state.

<i>Name of the dependency</i>	<i>Start date</i>	<i>End date</i>	<i>Colonial power</i>
Ifni	1478	1524	SPAIN
Venezuela	1528	1556	SPAIN
Rio de Janeiro	1574	1578	PORTUGAL
Gran Canaria	1480	1589	SPAIN
Margarita	1525	1600	SPAIN
Rio de Janeiro	1608	1612	PORTUGAL
Ceara	1534	1619	PORTUGAL
Hormuz	1515	1622	PORTUGAL
Tenerife	1496	1625	SPAIN
Sao Jorge da Mina	1482	1637	PORTUGAL
Sergipe d'el Rei	1590	1637	PORTUGAL
Ceuta	1415	1640	PORTUGAL
Malacca	1511	1641	PORTUGAL
Paraiba	1582	1645	PORTUGAL
Oman	1508	1650	PORTUGAL
New Holland	1641	1654	HOLLAND
New Sweden	1638	1655	SWEDEN
Ceylon	1598	1658	PORTUGAL
Mauritius	1638	1658	HOLLAND
Jamaica	1509	1660	SPAIN
Tangier	1471	1661	PORTUGAL
Tayowan	1624	1662	HOLLAND
New Haven	1643	1664	U.K.
Providence	1641	1665	SPAIN
Willoughby	1651	1670	U.K.
St Kitts	1623	1671	U.K.
Nevis	1628	1671	U.K.
Antigua	1635	1671	U.K.
Buenos Aires	1661	1671	SPAIN
Tortola	1648	1672	U.K.
New Netherlands	1624	1674	HOLLAND
Fort Dauphin	1642	1674	FRANCE
Bantam	1613	1682	U.K.
Tangier	1661	1684	U.K.
Surat	1612	1687	U.K.
Pomeroon	1657	1689	HOLLAND
New Plymouth	1620	1692	U.K.
New Hampshire	1680	1692	U.K.
Tortuga	1641	1697	U.K.
Mombasa	1593	1698	PORTUGAL
East New Jersey	1667	1702	U.K.



## Appendix (continued)

<i>Name of the dependency</i>	<i>Start date</i>	<i>End date</i>	<i>Colonial power</i>	
West New Jersey	1676	1702	U.K.	
Oran	1509	1708	SPAIN	
Sao Vicente	1532	1710	PORTUGAL	
Mauritius	1664	1710	HOLLAND	
Acadia	1604	1713	FRANCE	
Saint-Christophe	1628	1713	FRANCE	
Plaisance	1662	1713	FRANCE	
Pernambuco	1534	1716	PORTUGAL	
Esprtu Santo	1535	1718	PORTUGAL	
Mombasa	1728	1729	PORTUGAL	
Saint Thomas	1672	1734	DENMARK	
Saint Johns	1684	1734	DENMARK	
Principe	1500	1753	PORTUGAL	
Itanhaem	1624	1755	PORTUGAL	
Saint Croix	1733	1756	DENMARK	
Saint Johns & Saint Thomas	1734	1756	DENMARK	
Ft William	1700	1758	U.K.	
Lousiana	1699	1762	FRANCE	
Bahia	1534	1763	PORTUGAL	
Florida	1567	1763	SPAIN	
Quebec	1612	1763	FRANCE	
Senegal	1626	1763	FRANCE	
Montreal	1642	1763	FRANCE	
Grenada	1649	1763	FRANCE	
Ile Royale	1710	1763	FRANCE	
Ile Saint Jean	1720	1763	FRANCE	
The Gambia	1661	1766	U.K.	
the Misiones	1607	1767	SPAIN	
Dominica	1632	1771	FRANCE	
Maranhao	1652	1775	PORTUGAL	
Rio de Janeiro	1763	1775	PORTUGAL	
Nuevo Mexico	1598	1777	SPAIN	
Sacramento	1679	1777	PORTUGAL	
Senegambia	1763	1778	U.K.	
Tobago	1763	1781	U.K.	
Nevis	1671	1782	U.K.	
Virginia	1607	1783	U.K.	**
Massachusetts	1629	1783	U.K.	**
Maryland	1632	1783	U.K.	**
Connecticut	1639	1783	U.K.	**
North Carolina	1663	1783	U.K.	**
Rhode Island	1663	1783	U.K.	**
South Carolina	1663	1783	U.K.	**
New York	1664	1783	U.K.	**
Pennsylvania	1681	1783	U.K.	**
New Jersey	1702	1783	U.K.	**
Georgia	1733	1783	U.K.	**
New Hampshire	1741	1783	U.K.	**
East Florida	1763	1783	U.K.	
West Florida	1763	1783	U.K.	
Essequibo	1624	1784	HOLLAND	
Montserrat	1632	1784	U.K.	
Demarara	1750	1784	HOLLAND	
Barinas	1786	1789	SPAIN	

## Appendix (continued)

<i>Name of the dependency</i>	<i>Start date</i>	<i>End date</i>	<i>Colonial power</i>	
Quebec	1763	1791	U.K.	
Oran	1732	1792	SPAIN	
Tobago	1781	1793	FRANCE	
Guadeloupe	1635	1795	FRANCE	*
French Guiana	1644	1795	FRANCE	*
Reunion	1664	1795	FRANCE	*
Saint-Domingue	1697	1795	FRANCE	*
Ile de France	1715	1795	FRANCE	*
Sainte-Lucie	1756	1795	FRANCE	*
Louisiana	1762	1800	SPAIN	
Carnatic	1780	1801	U.K.	
Trinidad	1735	1802	SPAIN	
Ceylon	1640	1803	HOLLAND	
Louisiana	1800	1803	FRANCE	
Louisiana	1803	1804	U.S.A.	
Orleans	1804	1812	U.S.A.	*
Berbice	1627	1814	HOLLAND	
Cape Colony	1652	1814	HOLLAND	
Demarara and Essequibo	1784	1814	HOLLAND	
Seychelles	1794	1814	U.K.	
Ile de France	1803	1814	FRANCE	
Brazil	1775	1815	PORTUGAL	*
Cape Colony	1795	1815	HOLLAND	
Malabar Coast	1663	1818	HOLLAND	
Florida	1783	1819	SPAIN	
Cape Breton	1763	1820	U.K.	
Santo Domingo	1587	1821	SPAIN	
Canary Islands	1589	1821	SPAIN	*
Gold Coast	1632	1821	U.K.	
Guatemala	1670	1821	SPAIN	
Louisiana	1804	1821	U.S.A.	*
Coromandel Coast	1608	1825	HOLLAND	
Malacca	1641	1825	HOLLAND	
Haiti	1803	1825	FRANCE	**
Montevideo	1816	1828	PORTUGAL	**
Nueva Espana	1521	1830	SPAIN	**
Peru	1542	1830	SPAIN	**
Nueva Galicia	1549	1830	SPAIN	**
Charcas	1559	1830	SPAIN	**
Nueva Granada	1564	1830	SPAIN	**
Yucatan	1617	1830	SPAIN	**
Ecuador	1767	1830	SPAIN	**
Rio de la Plata	1777	1830	SPAIN	**
Venezuela	1777	1830	SPAIN	**
Chile	1778	1830	SPAIN	**
Barbados	1627	1833	U.K.	
Madras	1641	1833	U.K.	
Bombay	1661	1833	U.K.	
Grenada	1763	1833	U.K.	
St Vincent	1763	1833	U.K.	
Dominica	1771	1833	U.K.	
Tobago	1793	1833	U.K.	
St Lucia	1803	1838	U.K.	
Upper Canada	1791	1841	U.K.	

## Appendix (continued)

<i>Name of the dependency</i>	<i>Start date</i>	<i>End date</i>	<i>Colonial power</i>
Lower Canada	1791	1841	U.K.
Tranquebar	1620	1845	DENMARK
Curacao	1634	1845	HOLLAND
Saint Eustacius	1636	1845	HOLLAND
Sattara	1818	1848	U.K.
Sumbulpore	1803	1849	U.K.
Danish Gold Coast	1659	1850	DENMARK
Nagpore	1803	1853	U.K.
Ste-Marie de Madagascar	1819	1853	FRANCE
Jhansi	1818	1854	U.K.
Oudh	1797	1856	U.K.
Berar	1803	1856	U.K.
Coch Behar	1792	1858	U.K.
Hyderabad	1798	1858	U.K.
Mysore	1799	1858	U.K.
Cochin	1800	1858	U.K.
Travancore	1800	1858	U.K.
Scindia	1803	1858	U.K.
Gurhwal	1815	1858	U.K.
Goree	1854	1859	FRANCE
Moskito Coast	1740	1860	U.K.
Bay Island	1852	1860	U.K.
The Gambia	1843	1866	U.K.
Kaffraria	1847	1866	U.K.
Vancouver Island	1849	1866	U.K.
Gold Coast	1850	1866	U.K.
Lagos	1851	1866	U.K.
Dutch Gold Coast	1642	1867	HOLLAND
Nova Scotia	1749	1867	U.K.
New Brunswick	1784	1867	U.K.
Russian America	1821	1867	RUSSIA
Upper and Lower Canada	1841	1867	U.K.
Porto Novo	1863	1867	FRANCE
Rupert's Land	1670	1869	U.K.
Nicobar Islands	1756	1869	DENMARK
Assiniboia	1811	1870	U.K.
Grand Bassam	1843	1871	FRANCE
British Columbia	1858	1871	U.K.
Basutoland	1868	1871	U.K.
Prince Edward Island	1763	1873	U.K.
Turks and Caicos I	1848	1874	U.K.
St Barthelemy	1784	1878	SWEDEN
Nosy Be	1840	1878	FRANCE
Ste-Marie de Madagascar	1853	1878	FRANCE
Griqualand West	1873	1880	U.K.
Leeward Islands	1671	1882	U.K.
Nevis	1782	1882	U.K.
Basutoland	1871	1883	U.K.
Walvis Bay	1874	1884	U.K.
Assab	1882	1890	ITALY
Danakil	1885	1890	ITALY
Rivieres du Sud	1882	1893	FRANCE
Pahang	1874	1895	U.K.
Perak	1874	1895	U.K.

\*\*

## Appendix (continued)

<i>Name of the dependency</i>	<i>Start date</i>	<i>End date</i>	<i>Colonial power</i>	
Selangor	1874	1895	U.K.	
Bechuanaland	1885	1895	U.K.	
Negri Sembilan	1889	1895	U.K.	
Nosy Be	1878	1896	FRANCE	
Diego Suarez	1886	1896	FRANCE	
Zululand	1887	1897	U.K.	
Guam	1668	1898	SPAIN	
Puerto Rico	1508	1899	SPAIN	
Phillipines	1565	1899	SPAIN	
Marianas	1668	1899	SPAIN	
North Solomon Island	1885	1899	GERMANY	
Porto Novo	1883	1900	FRANCE	
Niger Coast Protectorate	1885	1900	U.K.	
Cuba	1764	1901	SPAIN	
New South Wales	1788	1901	U.K.	
Tasmania	1823	1901	U.K.	
Western Australia	1832	1901	U.K.	
South Australia	1836	1901	U.K.	
Victoria	1851	1901	U.K.	
Queensland	1859	1901	U.K.	
Niue	1900	1901	U.K.	
Middle Congo	1894	1903	FRANCE	
Lagos	1886	1906	U.K.	
Chad	1900	1906	FRANCE	
Protectorate of S Nigeria	1900	1906	U.K.	
Labuan	1846	1907	U.K.	
Cape Colony	1815	1910	U.K.	
Natal	1843	1910	U.K.	
Orange River Colony	1848	1910	U.K.	
Transvaal	1852	1910	U.K.	
Northern Australia	1863	1910	U.K.	
N E Rhodesia	1895	1911	U.K.	
N W Rhodesia	1897	1911	U.K.	
Middle Congo	1906	1911	FRANCE	
Mayotte	1841	1912	FRANCE	
Comoro Islands	1886	1912	FRANCE	
Melilla	1556	1913	SPAIN	
Ceuta	1668	1913	SPAIN	
Norfolk Island	1788	1914	U.K.	
Protectorate of N Nigeria	1900	1914	U.K.	
Comoro Islands	1912	1914	FRANCE	
Tokelau	1877	1916	U.K.	
Danish West Indies	1756	1917	DENMARK	
Marianas and Carolines	1899	1919	GERMANY	
Libya	1912	1919	ITALY	
German SW Africa	1884	1920	GERMANY	
German East Africa	1885	1920	GERMANY	
German New Guinea	1885	1920	GERMANY	
German Samoa	1899	1920	GERMANY	
Kameroun	1884	1922	GERMANY	
Togo	1885	1922	GERMANY	
Khiva	1873	1924	RUSSIA	*
Bukhara	1873	1924	RUSSIA	*
Dominican Republic	1907	1924	U.S.A.	**

## Appendix (continued)

<i>Name of the dependency</i>	<i>Start date</i>	<i>End date</i>	<i>Colonial power</i>	
Cuba	1901	1925	U.S.A.	**
Middle Congo	1911	1925	FRANCE	
Svalbard	1920	1925	NORWAY	*
Alula and Obbia	1889	1926	ITALY	
Cirenaica	1919	1928	ITALY	
Tripolitania	1919	1928	ITALY	
Weihaiwei	1898	1930	U.K.	**
Jan Mayen Land	1920	1930	NORWAY	*
Canada	1867	1931	U.K.	**
Upper Volta	1919	1932	FRANCE	
Iraq	1920	1932	U.K.	**
Middle Congo	1929	1932	FRANCE	
Nicaragua	1912	1933	U.S.A.	**
Union of South Africa	1910	1934	U.K.	**
Haiti	1915	1934	U.S.A.	**
Levant States	1919	1941	FRANCE	**
Papua	1883	1942	U.K.	
Australia	1901	1942	U.K.	**
Great Lebanon	1941	1943	FRANCE	**
Iceland	1415	1944	DENMARK	**
Tuva	1914	1944	RUSSIA	*
Nauru	1921	1945	U.K.	
Br New Guinea	1922	1945	U.K.	
Papua	1942	1945	AUSTRALIA	
Martinique	1635	1946	FRANCE	*
French Guiana	1803	1946	FRANCE	*
Guadeloupe	1803	1946	FRANCE	*
Reunion	1803	1946	FRANCE	*
Straits Settlements	1867	1946	U.K.	
Federated Malay States	1895	1946	U.K.	
Phillipines	1899	1946	U.S.A.	**
Western Samoa	1914	1946	U.K.	
Transjordan	1920	1946	U.K.	**
India	1765	1947	U.K.	**
New Zealand	1841	1947	U.K.	**
Indian Princely States	1858	1947	U.K.	
Niue	1901	1947	U.K.	
Italian East Africa	1935	1947	ITALY	**
Ceylon	1803	1948	U.K.	**
Tokelau	1916	1948	U.K.	
Palestine	1920	1948	U.K.	**
Burma	1937	1948	U.K.	**
Neth East Indies	1609	1949	HOLLAND	**
Newfoundland	1729	1949	U.K.	**
Bhutan	1910	1949	U.K.	**
Oman	1798	1951	U.K.	**
Libya	1928	1951	ITALY	**
Eritrea	1890	1952	ITALY	
Ifni	1934	1952	SPAIN	
Egypt	1883	1953	U.K.	**
Greenland	1894	1953	DENMARK	*
Laos	1897	1953	FRANCE	**
Cochin China	1862	1954	FRANCE	**
Cambodia	1863	1954	FRANCE	**

## Appendix (continued)

<i>Name of the dependency</i>	<i>Start date</i>	<i>End date</i>	<i>Colonial power</i>	
Annam	1883	1954	FRANCE	**
Tonkin	1888	1954	FRANCE	**
Tunis	1881	1956	FRANCE	**
Morocco	1911	1956	FRANCE	**
Spanish Morocco	1912	1956	SPAIN	**
Gold Coast	1874	1957	U.K.	**
Jamaica	1670	1958	U.K.	
French Equatorial Africa	1882	1958	FRANCE	
Spanish West Africa	1884	1958	SPAIN	
French Guinea	1893	1958	FRANCE	**
Chad	1920	1958	FRANCE	
Senegal	1778	1959	FRANCE	
Alaska	1867	1959	U.S.A.	*
French Sudan	1880	1959	FRANCE	
Hawaii	1898	1959	U.S.A.	*
Singapore	1942	1959	U.K.	**
Gabon	1845	1960	FRANCE	**
Cyprus	1878	1960	U.K.	**
Leeward Islands	1882	1960	U.K.	
British Somaliland	1884	1960	U.K.	**
Madagascar	1885	1960	FRANCE	**
Windward Islands	1885	1960	U.K.	
Belgian Congo	1887	1960	BELGIUM	**
Italian Somaliland	1889	1960	ITALY	**
Ivory Coast	1893	1960	FRANCE	**
Dahomey	1894	1960	FRANCE	**
Ubangi Shari	1894	1960	FRANCE	**
Mauritania	1902	1960	FRANCE	**
Federation of Nigeria	1906	1960	U.K.	**
Niger	1911	1960	FRANCE	**
Cameroun	1922	1960	FRANCE	**
Togo	1922	1960	FRANCE	**
Middle Congo	1941	1960	FRANCE	**
Upper Volta	1947	1960	FRANCE	**
Chad	1958	1960	FRANCE	**
Federation of Mali	1959	1960	FRANCE	**
Goa	1510	1961	PORTUGAL	**
Sao Joao Batista de Ajuda	1650	1961	PORTUGAL	**
Sierra Leone	1792	1961	U.K.	**
Trinidad and Tobago	1802	1961	U.K.	
Kuwait	1904	1961	U.K.	**
Tanganyika	1920	1961	U.K.	**
French India	1668	1962	FRANCE	**
Algeria	1830	1962	FRANCE	**
Falkland Islands	1834	1962	U.K.	
Uganda	1894	1962	U.K.	**
Ruanda-Urundi	1920	1962	BELGIUM	**
Western Samoa	1946	1962	NEW ZEALAND	**
Neth New Guinea	1949	1962	HOLLAND	
Jamaica	1961	1962	U.K.	**
Trinidad and Tobago	1961	1962	U.K.	**
Aden	1839	1963	U.K.	
Br North Borneo	1877	1963	U.K.	**
Kenya	1887	1963	U.K.	**

## Appendix (continued)

<i>Name of the dependency</i>	<i>Start date</i>	<i>End date</i>	<i>Colonial power</i>	
Sarawak	1888	1963	U.K.	**
Zanzibar	1891	1963	U.K.	**
Malaya	1946	1963	U.K.	**
Malta	1799	1964	U.K.	**
Nyasaland	1889	1964	U.K.	**
N Rhodesia	1911	1964	U.K.	**
Maldives	1887	1965	U.K.	**
Cook Islands	1888	1965	U.K.	**
The Gambia	1888	1965	U.K.	**
British Guiana	1831	1966	U.K.	**
Barbados	1855	1966	U.K.	**
Basutoland	1883	1966	U.K.	**
Bechuanaland	1895	1966	U.K.	**
Federation of S Arabia	1959	1967	U.K.	**
Grenada	1960	1967	U.K.	**
Dominica	1960	1967	U.K.	**
Antigua	1962	1967	U.K.	**
Mauritius	1814	1968	U.K.	**
Equatorial Guinea	1855	1968	SPAIN	**
Swaziland	1902	1968	U.K.	**
Nauru	1945	1968	AUSTRALIA	**
Ifni	1958	1969	SPAIN	**
St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla	1962	1969	U.K.	**
Fiji	1874	1970	U.K.	**
Tonga	1900	1970	U.K.	**
Turks and Caicos I	1962	1970	U.K.	**
Bahrain	1861	1971	U.K.	**
Trucial States	1891	1971	U.K.	**
Qatar	1916	1971	U.K.	**
Bahamas	1670	1973	U.K.	**
Portuguese Guinea	1879	1974	PORTUGAL	**
Grenada	1967	1974	U.K.	**
Cape Verde Islands	1462	1975	PORTUGAL	**
Sao Tome and Principe	1485	1975	PORTUGAL	**
Angola	1575	1975	PORTUGAL	**
Surinam	1667	1975	HOLLAND	**
Mozambique	1752	1975	PORTUGAL	**
Papua and New Guinea	1945	1975	AUSTRALIA	**
Spanish Sahara	1958	1975	SPAIN	*
Ste Pierre et Miquelon	1763	1976	FRANCE	*
Gilbert and Ellice I	1892	1976	U.K.	**
East Timor	1896	1976	PORTUGAL	**
Seychelles	1903	1976	U.K.	**
Comoro Islands	1947	1976	FRANCE	**
Br Indian Ocean Territory	1965	1976	U.K.	**
Djibouti	1862	1977	FRANCE	**
Solomon I	1893	1978	U.K.	**
Panama Canal Zone	1903	1978	U.S.A.	**
Dominica	1967	1978	U.K.	**
Ellice I	1976	1978	U.K.	**
St Lucia	1960	1979	U.K.	**
St Vincent	1960	1979	U.K.	**
Gilbert I	1976	1979	U.K.	**
Southern Rhodesia	1893	1980	U.K.	**

## Appendix (continued)

Name of the dependency	Start date	End date	Colonial power	
British Honduras	1786	1981	U.K.	**
Antigua and Barbuda	1967	1981	U.K.	**
Brunei	1888	1983	U.K.	**
St Kitts-Nevis	1969	1983	U.K.	**
Netherlands Antilles	1845	1986	HOLLAND	
Bermuda	1609	1987	U.K.	
St Helena	1651	1987	U.K.	
French Polynesia	1841	1987	FRANCE	
Hong Kong	1843	1987	U.K.	
Macao	1849	1987	PORTUGAL	
New Caledonia	1853	1987	FRANCE	
Pitcairn	1898	1987	U.K.	
Guam	1898	1987	U.S.A.	
Puerto Rico	1899	1987	U.S.A.	
American Samoa	1900	1987	U.S.A.	
Wallis and Futuna I	1917	1987	FRANCE	
Virgin Islands	1917	1987	U.S.A.	
Namibia	1920	1987	SOUTH AFRICA	
Niue	1947	1987	NEW ZEALAND	
Micronesia Trust Territory	1947	1987	U.S.A.	
Tokelau	1948	1987	NEW ZEALAND	
Ciskei	1951	1987	SOUTH AFRICA	
Bophuthatswana	1951	1987	SOUTH AFRICA	
Transkei	1951	1987	SOUTH AFRICA	
Venda	1951	1987	SOUTH AFRICA	
Lebowa	1951	1987	SOUTH AFRICA	
Gazankulu	1951	1987	SOUTH AFRICA	
KaNgwane	1951	1987	SOUTH AFRICA	
KwaNdebele	1951	1987	SOUTH AFRICA	
KwaZulu	1951	1987	SOUTH AFRICA	
QwaQwa	1951	1987	SOUTH AFRICA	
Br Virgin Islands	1960	1987	U.K.	
Montserrat	1960	1987	U.K.	
Cayman Islands	1962	1987	U.K.	
Falkland Islands	1962	1987	U.K.	
Cook Islands	1965	1987	NEW ZEALAND	
Anguilla	1969	1987	U.K.	
Br Indian Ocean Territory	1976	1987	U.K.	
Mayotte	1976	1987	FRANCE	
Ste Pierre et Miquelon	1985	1987	FRANCE	
Netherlands Antilles	1986	1987	HOLLAND	
Aruba	1986	1987	HOLLAND	

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